Supporting cultural groups: Towards a just society?
Cats: Society|
This paper challenges the claims of Will Kymlicka, made in his book ‘Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights.’
In his book, ‘Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights’ Kymlicka argues that cultural groups in general should be supported and given specific rights in order to be able to maintain their own culture and by doing so have an equal position in respect to other groups. He claims that from a liberal point of view, however, cultural groups should not be given rights that could harm the individual. But this second claim does in fact conflict with the first, since not giving these rights to groups could endanger the existence of the cultural group itself.
An example is female genital mutilation (FGM), which is known to be a cultural tradition that has a history of thousands of years in different places in the world, such as the Northern African region. Since 2007 the law prohibits this practice in Egypt , since the effects of female circumcisions have proved to cause diseases, psychological trauma’s or even death . From Kymlicka’s perspective the prohibition of FGM is a positive development, since it is an action to protect the individual from harmful cultural group practices.
But what if female circumcision is one of the main pillars of that culture, empowering the role of the woman within its community? From the perspective of the cultural group, being a circumcised woman increases the chances of finding an appropriate husband and having the respect of other members of the cultural group. When, on liberal grounds, it would be forbidden to have a circumcision, what would its effects be on that cultural group? If the uncircumcised women do not find husbands, or even worse, are rejected from their cultural group, does this not have a destabilizing effect on the cultural group as a whole?
Kymlicka argues that the state should prevent external threats which could destabilize the cultural group. Individuals, however, should be protected against harms of the cultural group. In the case of cultures executing FGM’s, Kymlicka’s two claims prove to conflict.
The same problem can be seen when considering the situation of Muslim homosexuals and Muslim apostates in The Netherlands. In Islam, it is a grave sin to commit apostasy or to be homosexual. When the Muslim community becomes aware of one of its members being guilty of this sin, according to the Quran, they would have the right to end this person’s life.
The Dutch government, however, enables Muslims to maintain their faith by giving them the right to have Muslim schools, mosques, etc. One could say that the Dutch government has had a supporting role towards this religious group.
If, according to Kymlicka, the government should support individuals against the harm of their religious group, this would mean that the government would have to support Muslim homosexuals and apostates who are rejected by their community and who are in grave danger. It would result in organizing special shelters for these groups and having some kind of reintegration programs enabling these individuals to start a new life elsewhere, perhaps even with a new identity.
By doing so, however, the Dutch government would be interfering with the fundamentals or the core values of this religious group, which would have a destabilizing effect and perhaps endanger its future existence in The Netherlands. Enabling individuals to leave this religious group could make it easier for other individual members of the group to leave. Women, for example, whose rights are not respected within this religious group could decide to leave, since there would be government support providing shelter and protection against the harm of the group and there is a chance to start a new life elsewhere.
Kymlicka’s claim that governments should protect individuals against harm of their own cultural or religious group is perhaps correct from a universal human rights perspective, but the claim does not stand against his other claim that government should protect cultural or religious groups against external restrictions which could destabilize it.
Kymlicka primary claim that by protecting cultural groups and by providing them with special rights in order to put them on a “more equal footing by reducing the extent to which the smaller group is vulnerable to the larger” , does not stand. When considering the position of the Moroccan minority in The Netherlands, for example, one has to refute his claim. The government of The Netherlands has supported this cultural group by acknowledging and supporting its culture. It has, for example, provided government communication in Arabic and Berber and it offers Arabic speaking intermediaries in its local government organizations to communicate with this group.
As a result of this policy, however, this group, and especially its older generation, lack the incentive to learn the Dutch language properly. The result of this shortcoming within this cultural group is that children from Moroccan families lack a proper knowledge of the Dutch language, fail to enroll in higher education and have difficulties finding fitting employment. This cultural group belongs to one of the largest groups of unemployed people in The Netherlands. Unemployment subsequently results in social and cultural isolation and a larger distance from the rest of the Dutch population.
In the end, the ‘support’ the Dutch government gave this cultural group by providing all necessary government communication in Arabic, resulted in this group having a weaker position against the larger. Therefore, Kymlicka’s claim of supporting ‘vulnerable’ cultural groups proved wrong in the case of the Moroccan minority in The Netherlands.
Besides the conflicting character of his claims, one would have to question Kymlicka’s overall claim about the support of cultural groups in general. It is characteristic for different cultures to have different values. In my opinion, however, having shared values could be the best base on which coherent societies could be built. Having shared values has proven its success when it comes to managing organizations and companies, why not for entire societies? From this perspective states supporting the maintaining of different and conflicting values would only diminish the chance of having social coherence in society. This is not a solid base for a just society, since the lack of social coherence and shared values could lead to culture clashes, misunderstandings and discrimination.
When examining the Dutch example of a government supporting different cultural groups we see that it eventually results into an unjust society where cultural groups have a weaker position towards the rest of the population and where the emphasis on different cultural values leads to fundamental conflicts within the Dutch society.
From my perspective Kymlicka made a mistake in his starting point when advocating support for cultural groups. If he would have advocated the support of multi-ethnicity instead of multiculturalism, the result of such policy would lead to a more just society. The emphasis of state support would then not be aimed at maintaining the different values of different cultural groups, but rather on the manifestations of different ethnic groups.
A concrete example could be the Municipality of The Hague giving subsidies to a Chinese-Dutch organization that organizes the Chinese New Year’s festivities in The Hague. This way government support is given to the manifestation of the ethnicity of a group, rather than on the culture of a group. In this case one should make a difference between ‘culture in the narrow sense’ and ‘culture in the broad sense’. ‘Culture in the narrow sense’ is considered to be the norms and values, symbols and heroes of a culture, while ‘culture in the broad sense’ is considered to be the visible and tangible manifestation of a culture. The emphasis on the multi-ethnicity of a society, which I would advocate, is based on the idea of states supporting different groups based on their ‘culture in the broad sense’. The Chinese community this way is given acknowledgement of its existence, without supporting its cultural values. Notice the difference in result when compared to the Dutch governments support to Muslim schools that advocate traditions that could harm individuals.
This approach of supporting cultural groups ‘in the broad sense’ is one which is visible in the U.S where there are very active and visible communities based on religion or ethnicity, but where shared values among its citizens are the base of the overall American culture. Values as freedom and equality as general American values are superior among all American citizens. Their own ‘cultural’ values have an inferior position against these general American values.
In a nutshell one could say that Kymlicka’s claims about government support to cultural groups in order to empower them in society works contra productive. His claim to support individuals against the harm of their religious or cultural groups results in weakening the cultural or religious groups and conflicts with his initial claim. And to conclude, Kymlicka’s aim of creating a just society by giving government support to cultural groups proves to be contra productive as well since cultures have different values and a society with conflicting values is one that increases the probability of an unjust society.
